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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2013, Joy Guion, an employee at HSM Solutions, a
diversified manufacturing company, traveled to Clinica Biblica, a
hospital in San Jose, Costa Rica for gastric sleeve surgery.1 The
surgery, which would have cost approximately $30,000 in the
United States, cost only $17,386 in Costa Rica.2 This included the
cost of in-patient stay in a “pristine room” in a “state-of-the-art
hospital.”3 Even with insurance, Guion would have paid $3,000 out
of pocket in the United States.4 However, in Costa Rica, Guion pays
nothing; the company foots the bill not only for the medical
expense, but transportation and lodging as well.5 Guion is part of
an ever-increasing wave of Americans who are electing to receive
medical care internationally.6
Although the reasons many
Americans, including Guion, travel abroad for medical care vary, the
most powerful incentive, by far, is cost.7
U.S. patients continue to spend a disproportionately large
percentage of their wealth on health care compared to those of other
1
Nightline: US Companies Look to ‘Medical Tourism’ to Cut Costs (ABC television
broadcast Oct. 10, 2013), available at http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/video/uscompanies-medical-tourism-cut-costs-20427966; Ask a Patient: Americans Turn to
Medical Tourism for Healthcare Relief, MED. TOURISM MAG. (Sept. 12, 2014), available at
http://www.medicaltourismmag.com/blog/2014/09/ask-patient-americans-turnmedical-tourism-relief-bleeding-healthcare-system/.
2
Medical Tourism Surgeries Pay Off Overseas for U.S. Employers, MED. TOURISM MAG.
(Oct. 1, 2013), available at http://www.medicaltourismmag.com/news/2013/10/
medical-tourism-surgeries-pay-off-overseas-for-u-s-employers/.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Linda F. Powers, Leveraging Medical Tourism, THE SCIENTIST, Mar. 1, 2006, at 79,
available
at
http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/23768/title/
Leveraging-Medical-Tourism/. In 2004, Powers estimated that Thailand alone received
over one million medical tourists from Australia, Europe, and the United States. Id.
Powers went on to predict that in the “next five to seven years” medical tourism would
increase six-fold to approximately six million by 2012. Id. See also Nathan Cortez,
Cross Border Health Care and the Hydraulics of Health Reform, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF
HEALTH CARE 65, 70 (I. Glenn Cohen, ed., 2013) (“[S]urvey results lend some credibility
to the anecdotal evidence that U.S. patients increasingly travel for health care.”). But
see Reenita Das, Medical Tourism Gets a Facelift. . .and Perhaps a Pacemaker, FORBES (Aug.
19, 2014, 2:48 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/reenitadas/ 2014/08/19/medicaltourism-gets-a-facelift-and-perhaps-a-pacemaker/ (stating that in 2014 only 1.25
million Americans traveled overseas for medical care). While it is clear that medical
tourism is increasing, it remains unclear the extent to which U.S. patients are actually
going overseas.
7
Heather T. Williams, Fighting Fire With Fire: Reforming the Health Care System
Through a Market-Based Approach to Medical Tourism, 89 N.C. L. REV. 607, 613 (2011);
Kerrie S. Howze, Medical Tourism: Symptom or Cure?, 41 GA. L. REV. 1013, 1017 (2007).
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industrialized nations.8 As an illustrative example, the cost of a
Caesarean section in the United States averages approximately
$15,041.9 In contrast, the cost of the same procedure in France or
South Africa is $6,441 and $3,449, respectively.10 These estimates
indicate U.S. patients could receive a 57% to 78% discount for the
same treatment by going overseas. In fact, some research suggests
that foreign care could undercut U.S. prices by up to 90%.11 Data
establishing the phenomenal cost savings available to U.S. patients
by going overseas is overwhelming.12
In addition to tremendous cost savings, the factor that makes
medical tourism stand out as an attractive and viable solution for
the rising cost of health care is the distinct lack of legal and
regulatory barriers.13 There are virtually no federal laws, state laws,
or regulations purporting to oversee medical tourism.14 Indeed,
Texas is the only state that has made any effort to place a legal or
regulatory restriction on medical tourism.15 In 2007, the Texas
Insurance Department promulgated a regulation that prohibits “[a]
health benefit plan issuer [from issuing or offering for sale] a health
benefit plan that requires an enrollee to travel to a foreign country to
receive a particular health care service . . . .”16 However, the language
8
See, e.g., Susan Adler Channick, Health Care Cost Containment: No Longer an
Option but a Mandate, 13 NEV. L. J. 792, 792–805 (2013) (explaining the unsustainable
trajectory of U.S. health costs).
9
Elisabeth Rosenthal, American Way of Birth, Costliest in the World, N.Y. TIMES, July
1, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/health/americanway-of-birth-costliest-in-the-world.html.
10
Id.
11
Christopher J. Brady, Offshore Gambling: Medical Outsourcing Versus ERISA’s
Fiduciary Duty Requirement, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1073, 1107 (2007).
12
See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 9 (comparing the cost of delivering a child in the
United States to six other countries); Williams, supra note 7, at 613; Mohd Jamal
Alsharif, Ronald Labonté & Zuxun Lu, Patients Beyond Borders: A Study of Medical Tourists
in Four Countries, 10 GLOBAL SOC. POL’Y 315, 325 (2010); Thomas R. McLean, The Global
Market for Health Care: Economics and Regulation, 26 WIS. INT’L L. J. 591, 596–97 (2008);
Brady, supra note 11, at 1094.
13
See I. Glenn Cohen, Medical Tourism, Access to Health Care, and Global Justice, 52
VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 36 (2011) (“True, the U.S. government has not taken steps to prevent
travel to India for medical procedures . . . .”); Angeleque Parsiyar, Medical Tourism: The
Commodification of Health Care in Latin America, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 379, 397 (2009)
(stating that there is currently no formal regulation of the medical tourist industry).
14
Cohen, supra note 13, at 36 (“In medical tourism by patients paying out of
pocket, we do not have the U.S. government or international bodies directly creating
push and pull factors.”); see also Nathan Cortez, Patients Without Borders: The Emerging
Global Market for Patients and the Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 IND. L. J. 71, 81–
90 (2008) (describing recent trends that facilitate medical tourism).
15
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1216.004 (West 2009).
16
Id. (emphasis added).
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of the regulation only prohibits insurance companies or employers
from requiring out of country care.17 Put differently, providing an
overseas health care option concomitantly with domestic care is
permissible.18 In the same vein, California is the only state to have
officially sanctioned medical tourism.19
In the absence of legal limitations, various insurance company
pilot programs incentivize patients to use medical tourism
options.20 Guion’s case is hardly unique.21 As early as 2006, Blue
Ridge, a self-insured manufacturer of paper products, offered to
send one of its employees to India to undergo elective shoulder
surgery to correct a rotator cuff injury and to have his gallbladder
removed.22 The company stood to save approximately $80,000 and
offered to share $10,000 of the savings with the employee.23 In this
respect, medical tourism is recognized as a “trade-off for consumers,
allowing patients to opt out of increased regulation in favor of looser
restrictions and greater cost savings.”24
Despite the undeniable cost savings, numerous scholars have
theorized that medical tourism, if widespread, could result in

17

Id.
Id. As of this writing, the matter has never been litigated.
19
The California regulation states that a Mexican health plan may treat a California
citizen provided that the Mexican health provider obtains proper state licensure. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1351.2(a) (West 2008); Rebecca Bennie, Medical Tourism: A
Look at How Medical Outsourcing Can Reshape Health Care, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 583, 597
n.145 (2014); see also Cortez, supra note 14, at 100 (“Three insurers in California pay
for U.S. residents to obtain care in Mexico.”) (citation omitted).
20
For example, the Medical Tourism Association’s website references a pilot
program with the goal of “certifying medical tourism facilitators.” Roy G. Spece, Jr.
Medical Tourism: Protecting Patients from Conflicts of Interest in Broker’s Fees Paid by Foreign
Providers, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 16 n.73 (2010) (citation omitted); see also
Brady, supra note 11, at 1103 (referencing the 2006 Blue Ridge Paper Products
incident); MAGGI ANN GRACE, STATE OF THE HEART: A MEDICAL TOURIST’S TRUE STORY OF
LIFESAVING SURGERY IN INDIA (2007) (referencing the mitral valve replacement of
Howard Staab in New Delhi); Walecia Konrad, Going Abroad to Find Affordable Health
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/03/21/health/21patient.html.
21
See infra notes 22–24, 26 and accompanying text.
22
Walecia Konrad, Employers Make a Push for ‘Medical Tourism’, FORTUNE SMALL BUS.
MAG., May 1, 2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/ magazines/fsb/fsbarchive/
2007/05/01/100003808/; Saritha Rai, Union Disrupts Plan To Send Ailing Workers to
India for Cheaper Medical Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at C6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/11/business/worldbusiness/11health.html.
23
However, at the last minute, the United Steelworker’s Union threatened to bring
a lawsuit alleging that foreign surgical facilities would provide substandard medical
care. McLean, supra note 12, at 600.
24
See Williams, supra note 7, at 611 (emphasis added).
18
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devastating effects to the global health care framework.25 As a result
of these potentially negative effects, these scholars have warned
against wholesale adoption of medical tourism as a health access
solution.26 However, the warnings of the academic community,
while troubling, have not been able to halt medical tourism’s rapid
expansion.27 Medical tourism has already taken off as an
increasingly important piece of the health care delivery puzzle.28 In
fact, since health care costs will remain high in the future, medical
tourism will likely continue.29 Arguably, it must continue in order

25

See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality, 19
ANNALS HEALTH L. 269, 294–298 (2010) (suggesting that while medical tourism has the
potential to dramatically reshape health delivery vis-à-vis cost, it also creates issues of
access inequality); Nathan Cortez, Recalibrating the Legal Risks of Cross-Border Health
Care, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 41 (2010) (“Though medical tourism draws
new revenues to Thailand, critics argue that it crowds out the medical care available to
ordinary Thais.”); Tyler Grant, Note, Made in America: Medical Tourism and Birth Tourism
Leading to a Larger Base of Transient Citizenship, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 159, 170 (2015)
(“As Taiwan-China relations improve, and the Taiwanese economy worsens, an
increasing number of Taiwanese citizens are using their dual citizenships in the United
States, Australia, and other countries to work abroad and then return to Taiwan for
cheap medical treatment.”).
26
See Cohen, supra note 13, at 6–7 (stating that medical tourism is limited by
certain moral or “global justice” obligations of source countries towards destination
countries); see also M. Neil Browne, Chelsea K. Brown & Facundo Bouzat, American
Medical Tourism: Regulating a Cure That Can Damage Consumer Health, 25 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 319, 339–47 (2013) (stating that medical tourism is limited by the
comparative health, legal, and regulatory risks incurred by overseas patients). This
Note recognizes that the medical tourism industry is not yet fully mature, but evidence
shows that issues of quality of care seem to be unfounded. See, e.g., Elisabeth
Rosenthal, In Need of a New Hip, but Priced Out of the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/health/for-medical-tourists-simple-math.html
(stating that while some tourists’ destinations—the article studied Belgium—lack
amenities, infection rates are lower than in the United States, possibly indicating a
difference in quality); Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce Health
Care Costs?: Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 12–13 (2006)
(statement of Magi Ann Grace).
27
See Vadim Schick, Data Privacy Concerns for U.S. Healthcare Enterprises’ Overseas
Ventures, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 173, 175 (2011) (“In this regard, India’s medical
tourism sector is expected to grow 30 percent annually from 2009 to 2015”); Maria
Lenhart, Survey Sees Robust Growth for Medical Tourism, TRAVEL MARKET REPORT (Apr. 4,
2013), http://www.travelmarketreport.com/articles/Survey-Sees-Robust-Growth-forMedical-Tourism (“Sixty percent of respondents to the Medical Tourism Climate
Survey 2013 reported growth in international patients during the past 12 months.”).
28
McLean, supra note 12, at 599 (suggesting that the global market for medical
tourism already has economic clout). See also Bennie, supra note 19, at 587.
29
See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, The $2.7 Trillion Medical Bill, N.Y. TIMES (June 1,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/health/colonoscopies-explain-why-usleads-the-world-in-health-expenditures.html (stating that health care spending is “still
expected to rise faster than the gross domestic product”).
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to ensure access to health care.30 The problem then becomes how
medical tourism will scale to take advantage of its reduced costs,
while recognizing the harm to the global health care framework.
This Note addresses the specific problem that medical tourism
poses to the global health care framework. It then proposes a
solution to that problem through a regulatory mechanism. Part II
describes volume shock, a key danger of medical tourism to the
global health framework, and a problem that could potentially
destabilize the current medical tourism system causing service
shortages to U.S. patients. Part III describes the proposed solution
to this problem involving a two stage regulatory mechanism. This
regulatory mechanism theorizes that de minimis regulation coupled
with patient behavior can be used to internally self-regulate medical
tourism. Specifically, the effect of moral hazard and patient
trepidation may operate to limit patient volume without a
tremendously complex regulatory scheme.31 Should de minimis
regulation fail, Part III proposes various theories that could be
helpful in determining the outer boundaries of a replacement
regulatory scheme. Part IV offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE VOLUME SHOCK PROBLEM
Although medical tourism has been growing, there is no
consensus regarding a marked negative effect to American patients
or destination health delivery.32 Consequently, it may very well be
that the recent observed growth of health tourism is simply a
product of increasing globalization in a digital age, health care
included.33 If so, this Note is not objecting to globalization itself.
Rather, this Note explores the concept of volume shock—a rapid
increase in patient volume causing the failure of both global and
30

Williams, supra note 7, at 611.
See discussion infra Part III(B).
32
See, e.g., Y.Y. Brandon Chen & Colleen M. Flood, Medical Tourism’s Impact on
Health Care Equity and Access in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: Making the Case for
Regulation, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 286, 287 (2013) (“[T]here appears to be consensus
among academics that current understanding about medical tourism and its effects . . .
largely derives from ‘theory, assumption or conjecture.’”); Pasquale, supra note 25, at
273 (“Medical tourism has dual effects . . . both diverting doctors away from
indigenous populations and supplying capital that may build health infrastructure in
those nations.”).
33
See Cohen, supra note 13, at 7 (suggesting that medical tourism is part of a larger
move toward the globalization of health care, but also including such phenomena as
“brain drain,” medical outsourcing, research tourism, and parallel trade in approved
pharmaceuticals). See generally, JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK (1st
ed. 2007) (discussing economic globalization and its effect on developing nations).
31
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domestic health care frameworks—and to what extent it may be
monitored and limited.
Previous scholarship has described the danger of medical
tourism and its effect on the tripartite concerns of quality, cost, and
access.34 Certainly, these factors can be used to explain the medical
tourism problem.35 However, this Note uses the singular factor—
patient volume—to discuss the effect of medical tourism on U.S.
health care.
Medical tourism serves an increasingly important role as a relief
valve for the U.S. health care economy.36 Arguably, since at least
2006, medical tourism has provided an avenue of financial relief to
those individuals otherwise priced out of the U.S. health system.37
Medical tourism already provides a powerful alternative for
obtaining cheap health care. Any corrective action to modify its
current course should take into account its benefit to the U.S. public
without adhering to an abstract notion of global justice.38 However,
there is a reason to curb medical tourism’s expansion. As the
popularity of medical tourism grows, the volume of patients will
grow proportionately, presenting a threat to the U.S. health care

34
The sources that describe these effects are numerous. They generally indicate
that quality of care is more of a perceived issue than an actual issue. In fact, the quality
of care received by individuals like Guion is often on par with or superior to the care
received in the United States. See Ask a Patient: Americans Turn to Medical Tourism for
Healthcare Relief, supra note 1. See also Cortez, supra note 14, at 82–86. As described
above, cost of care in destination countries is usually significantly reduced. See supra
notes 8–12 and accompanying text. Volume and volume shock as discussed in this
Note has the most noticeable effect on health care access. See Cortez, supra note 14, at
108. Access is also perhaps the most difficult term to define in health law. Martin
Gulliford et al., What Does ‘Access to Health Care’ Mean?, 7 J. HEALTH SERV. RESEARCH &
POLICY 186, 186–88 (2002). However, while it is true that international care decreases
geographic access, the significant reduction in cost results in an overall increase in
access to care from a financial standpoint. For a more nuanced discussion of how
medical tourism affects health care access, see Nathan Cortez, Patients Without Borders:
The Emerging Global Market for Patients and the Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 IND.
L.J. 71, 107–14 (2008).
35
See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 14, at 108.
36
See Rosenthal, supra note 26; Bennie, supra note 19, at 587 (“The allure of lowcost medical care to potential medical tourists is undeniable, especially to the
uninsured and underinsured.”); Cortez, supra note 14, at 77 (“In India alone, the
number of medical tourists visiting the country tripled between 2002 and 2006, and is
expected to rise by 600% over the next few years.”).
37
See Brady, supra note 11, at 1103 (discussing Blue Ridge Paper Products, the first
widely publicized medical tourism case). Cf. Cortez, supra note 14, at 77 (suggesting
that medical tourist data has been available since 2002).
38
See Cohen, supra note 13 (discussing the effect of health tourism from a global
justice perspective).
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system.39 Scholars have yet to articulate the parallel problem that
medical tourism poses in the United States and other source
countries.40 The general substance of this problem follows.
Currently, a large portion of funding for community hospitals,
especially emergency departments—the U.S. health safety net—
comes from cross-subsidized specialty care.41
Although the
phenomenon is complex, the general thrust is that revenue
generated from specialty departments, such as neurology,
cardiology, and orthopedic surgery is used to keep “unprofitable”
but socially desirable services, namely emergency departments,
afloat.42
As the cost of health care rises, more people will be priced out
of domestic private insurance.43 Without domestic health care
options, individuals who have been priced out will increasingly seek
care overseas due to the attractive prices of medical tourism.44 This
Note posits that as the amount of patients seeking international
solutions for medical care increases, the number of patients
requiring domestic specialty care decreases. Less specialty care
patients means less overall revenue for community hospitals,
jeopardizing the cross-subsidization scheme of hospital emergency
departments.45 The potential for medical tourism to cause the
39

See discussion infra Part II.
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 13; Chen & Flood, supra note 32, at 288–90
(discussing how health tourism may create increased competition for health resources
between foreign patients and domestic patients but not discussing the effect to
domestic—or source—health services).
41
See Erik J. Olson, No Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency Room,
46 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1994) (“The emergency rooms of American hospitals have
frequently become the principal suppliers of nonurgent primary care to the under- and
uninsured.”). See also Elizabeth Weeks, After the Catastrophe: Disaster Relief for Hospitals,
85 N.C.L. REV. 223, 231 (2006) (footnote omitted).
42
See generally MICHAEL E. PORTER & ELIZABETH OLMSTED TEISBERG, REDEFINING
HEALTHCARE, 65–66 (2006) (“Patients covered by the public sector are subsidized by
private sector patients. Within the private sector, patients enrolled in large health plans
are perversely subsidized by members of small groups, the uninsured, and out-ofnetwork patients, who pay higher [than] even list prices.”). Guy David et al., Do
Hospitals Cross Subsidize?, 37 J. HEALTH ECONOMICS 198 (2011), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w17300.pdf; Suzanne Strothkamp, Understanding the
Physician-Owned Specialty Hospital Phenomenon: The Confluence of DRG Payment
Methodology and Physician Self-Referral Laws, 38 J. HEALTH L. 673, 677–82, 684–85
(2005).
43
See Bennie, supra note 19, at 587 (“In the face of prohibitively high healthcare
costs, Americans are traveling abroad for medical care by the hundreds of
thousands . . . .”).
44
Id.
45
This parallels the debate over the rise of single specialty hospitals in the late
1990s. See, e.g., Unmesh Kher, The Hospital Wars, TIME, Dec. 05, 2006; Mike J. Wyatt,
40
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failure of domestic health delivery systems is the volume shock
problem. In the worst case scenario, dwindling cross-subsidization
will cause hospital emergency departments to close.46
An effective medical tourism regulatory scheme must balance
two competing interests. On the one hand, medical tourism can be
used as a tool to increase the access of individuals to medically
necessary (or eventually medically necessary) procedures.47 On the
other hand, medical tourism must be monitored so that action can
be taken to avoid volume shock. This Note proposes a methodology
to balance these opposing interests.
Before presenting any theory on regulatory structure, it is
important to recognize that volume shock is peculiarly affected by a
patient’s ability to pay for care.48 Thus, any discussion of where
volume shock potentially originates must begin with a discussion of
health insurance.49 Essentially, three broad categories of individuals
benefit from medical tourism.50 At one extreme, there are those with
insurance, either public or private, that will cover the cost of a
procedure without any co-payment on the part of the consumer.51
These individuals are not addressed by this Note as they will
invariably receive domestic treatment and therefore have little
overall effect on total patient volume.
That leaves two types of individuals who receive medical care
The first involves uninsured or underinsured
overseas.52
Leveling the Healing Field: Specialty Hospital Legal Reform as a Cure for an Ailing Health
Care System, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 547 (2007).
46
See generally David et al., supra note 42; Mona Al-Amin et al., Specialty Hospital
Market Proliferation: Strategic Implications for General Hospitals, 35 HEALTH CARE MGMT.
REV. 294, 298–99 (2010) (discussing the negative economic effect of single specialty
hospitals on non-profit general hospitals with emergency departments).
47
Cf. Cortez, supra note 14, at 108 (“[M]edical tourism should improve access to
care for two significant populations: the uninsured and the underinsured.”).
48
See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 26 (expanding on pricing problems and the
reluctance of insurers to pay for procedures).
49
Id.
50
This is based loosely on the framework proposed by Kopson. See Mark S.
Kopson, Medical Tourism: Implications for Providers and Plans, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L.
147, 159–62 (2010).
51
One such example of public health insurance is Medicare and Medicaid.
According to a statistical brief by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality,
Medicare pays for the cost of approximately 63.4% of all hip replacements; Medicaid
pays for 6.8%. Combined, federal health programs pay for over 70% of all hip
replacements in the U.S. CHAYA MERRILL & ANNE ELIXHAUSER, HOSPITAL STAYS INVOLVING
MUSCULOSKELETAL PROCEDURES, at 9 (2007), available at http://www.hcupus.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb34.pdf (based on data available from 2004).
52
Note that this model is an oversimplification: it assumes that income
demographics are classifiable into discrete buckets, although the demographics of
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individuals.53 These individuals cannot afford domestic health
insurance but may have the savings to obtain treatment abroad.54
The second involves insured individuals being incentivized to take
part in overseas treatment as part of their insurance plans: what this
Note refers to as the incentivized insured.55 This latter group poses
the greatest threat to the global health framework because it has the
potential to inflate patient volume tremendously.56 These two
groups can each be further divided into three sub-groups, giving a
total of six groups.
Uninsured or underinsured individuals:
—- seeking purely medically unnecessary care
—- seeking eventually medically necessary care
—- seeking medically necessary care
Insured individuals being incentivized to take part in medical
tourism programs:
—- seeking purely medically unnecessary care
—- seeking eventually medically necessary care
—- seeking medically necessary care
A. Eliminating Types of Treatment from the Framework Analysis
For uninsured or underinsured individuals seeking medically
necessary care overseas the system should remain intact. Assuming
that medical tourism ought to be used as a device to increase access
to medically necessary health services, it is axiomatic to conclude
that the law should not prohibit individuals from taking advantage
of potentially lifesaving care.57 In fact, this sort of care should be
income likely exist as a continuum. Further, this model fails to recognize the impact
of medical tourism on undocumented immigrants, a conversation that is, regrettably,
beyond the scope of this Note. However, it is useful for the purposes of illustration to
consider how these groups affect the medical tourism economy.
53
I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and the PatientProtective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1473 (2010) (indicating the possibility of
medical tourism growth from uninsured and underinsured patients).
54
Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce Health Care Costs?:
Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 3–5 (2006) (testimony of Magi
Ann Grace).
55
See also Cohen, supra note 53, at 1473 (dubbing the same phenomenon
“insurer-prompted medical tourism”). Cohen also demarcates treatment as invasive,
diagnostic, or lifestyle. “Lifestyle” ostensibly includes “nutrition, weight reduction and
anti-aging treatments” and in this case may be a subset of the type of treatment
described in this Note as “medically unnecessary.” Cohen supra note 53, at 1479–80.
It is unclear how treatment containing an invasive element and a lifestyle element, e.g.,
facelifts, are properly categorized under the framework established by Cohen.
56
Id. at 1486.
57
This is especially true if the care is preventative care or non-emergency care,
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prioritized.58 This is especially true where domestic markets have
failed by pricing out their own consumers.59
Since underinsured and uninsured patients lack sufficient
insurance to cover a given procedure, they cannot obtain care
domestically.60 Where the individual can afford to have the
procedure done overseas, it seems unduly restrictive to force the
individual to wait until the procedure is medically necessary (and
therefore covered by insurance) to obtain it. In these situations,
patients seeking eventually medically necessary care face the same
problem as patients seeking medically necessary care.61 Attempting
to bar such care would deny access to health care that is obtainable.
Despite the connotation that uninsured and underinsured
patients are less financially well off (compared to insured patients)
and therefore more in need of health care coverage, medical tourism
as a treatment option for these groups should not be absolute. The
subgrouping above makes an important distinction between purely
medically unnecessary care and eventually medically necessary care.
Individuals who are uninsured or underinsured may still be less
“deserving” of treatment if what they are seeking amounts to purely
medically unnecessary care. 62 This distinction is a way of triaging
which most medical tourism is. See Tony Hope, Rationing and Life-Saving Treatments:
Should Identifiable Patients Have Higher Priority?, 27 J. MED. ETHICS 179, 183–84 (2001)
(stating that preventative care is both ethically and financially more efficient than
“rescue” care). Cf. Cortez, supra note 14, at 89 (stating that many medical tourists
cannot receive emergency treatment overseas because they may be too frail or ill to
travel).
58
Cf. David et al., supra note 42, at 29–30 (espousing the benefits of community
hospitals in providing socially desirable—though financially uncompensated—care).
The priority of lifesaving care has been a hotly debated ethical issue. See, e.g., Eleanor
D. Kinney, Realizing the International Human Right to Health: The Challenge of For-Profit
Health Care, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 49, 56-57 (2010) (discussing the development of a
rights-based approach or entitlement to health care).
59
See Rosenthal, supra note 26 (presenting the case of Michael Shopenn, a 67 year
old photographer and snowboarder priced out of the U.S. health system when
insurance refused to cover his hip-replacement due to a pre-existing condition).
60
See supra note 53.
61
Where treatment is integral to patient fitness, the only question that remains is
when should that treatment be received? What are the ethical ramifications of allowing
an individual to suffer while a diagnosis awaits approval for medical necessity? See
Rosenthal, supra note 26 (“Mr. Shopenn . . . had been in such pain from arthritis that
he could not stand long enough to make coffee, let alone work.”).
62
There is a tendency to view certain types of care—namely cosmetic—as less
“deserving” of the type of attention that other non-cosmetic care receives. Cf. Thomas
v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 568 N.E.2d 937, 940 (Ill. 1991) (holding that an insurance
company’s decision to refuse coverage of cosmetic surgery was not arbitrary and
capricious); 26 U.S.C.A. § 213(d)(9)(A) (West 2011) (“The term ‘medical care’ does
not include cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures, unless the surgery or
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access to medical tourism procedures based on the type of treatment
sought. Medically unnecessary care is usually thought of as care that
is not essential for the purpose of treating affliction.63 This Note
challenges that existing definition of medically unnecessary.64
Medically unnecessary care actually encompasses two distinct
categories: pure medically unnecessary care and eventually medically
necessary care.
The best way to illustrate this dichotomy is through a case study
of lower extremity joint replacements (“LEJRs”), which include knee
replacements and hip replacements: operations most likely to see a
surge in demand.65
A knee diagnosed with degenerative
osteoarthritis may eventually require a total knee replacement
(“TKR”).66 The patient may choose to undergo the procedure
preemptively, i.e., before it is explicitly required or indicated.67 In
this case, the issue of necessity becomes predicated on timing:
should the knee be operated on now or later? Even when the
procedure is undertaken in order to maintain a certain standard of
living—a patient undergoes a preemptive TKR to continue playing
tennis—it remains true that the procedure will be indicated or
ordered eventually.68 Advances in medical technology and the
longevity of artificial implants means that a procedure done earlier
will likely increase quality of life with no materially negative effect
procedure is necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a
congenital abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or
disfiguring disease.”).
63
Liza Khan, Transgender Health at the Crossroads: Legal Norms, Insurance Markets,
and the Threat of Healthcare Reform, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 375, 399 (2011)
(“Medically unnecessary interventions include, but are not limited to, procedures
insurers conclude are cosmetic or experimental. The medical-necessity requirement is
at once the broadest and least defined exclusion clause in most insurance plans.”).
64
See Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce Health Care Costs?:
Hearing Before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 14 (2006) (statement of Magi
Ann Grace) available at http://www.aging.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/hr159mg.pdf
(alleging that an insurance company would not pay for a removal of a tooth until it
had been “impacted and abscessed”).
65
See Rosenthal, supra note 26 (“With baby boomers determined to continue
skiing, biking and running into their 60s and beyond, economists predict a surge in
joint replacement surgeries . . . .”).
66
PEGGY A. HOUGLUM, THERAPEUTIC EXERCISE FOR MUSCULOSKELETAL INJURIES (3d ed.
2010), available at http://www.humankinetics.com/excerpts/excerpts/total-kneereplacement-for-treatment-of-knee-osteoarthritis (detailing total knee replacement
treatment for knee osteoarthritis).
67
See Elisabeth Rosenthal, In Need of a New Hip, but Priced Out of the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/health/for-medicaltourists-simple-math.html.
68
Special thanks to Professor John Jacobi who first provided insight into this
particular angle.
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even if the procedure is undertaken before it is “medically
necessary.”69 The practical effect of distinguishing a treatment that
is eventually medically necessary from one that is purely medically
necessary is very close to zero. The mere fact that an individual has
not yet been medically authorized to receive a procedure does not
obviate the eventual need for such a procedure.70 When a patient
chooses to preemptively undergo a procedure before his or her
fitness fails, it is said to be “eventually medically necessary.”71
This is in contrast to a procedure undertaken purely for
aesthetic or cosmetic reasons.72 For example, procedures such as
non-corrective rhinoplasty or breast augmentation are purely
medically unnecessary.73 While there is an argument that so long as
the procedure is eventually undertaken the patient should remain a
consumer of domestic health care, such an argument is tenuous.
This is especially true because a majority of insurers (including
Medicare and Medicaid) will not pay for procedures deemed
medically unnecessary.74
Returning to the example of LEJR, an insurance company will
likely refuse to pay for the procedure even if it is eventually needed.75
In fact, a CMS memo published in 2012 states that “[major joint
replacement surgery: hip and knee] is reserved for patients whose
symptoms have not responded to other treatments.”76 However, an
69
See Rosenthal, supra note 26 (“Some [artificial implants] use more durable
materials so that a patient requiring a hip implant at age 40 or 50 might rely on it
longer than the standard 20 years . . . .”).
70
Id.
71
See infra discussion accompanying Part II.
72
See supra note 62.
73
Despite the advantages of using LEJR as an illustrative example, I cannot
conceive of an LEJR being undertaken for cosmetic or aesthetic reasons.
74
Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce Health Care Costs?:
Hearing before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 3 (2006) (statement of Magi
Ann Grace) (“It is, of course, a mistake to say that our government does not provide
[uninsured or underinsured] people with healthcare. We do. Only we do it in what
may be the least efficient, the most expensive and least effective way possible: by
refusing to provide any necessary care until a patient’s illness becomes a medical
emergency.”).
75
Id. See also Rosenthal, supra note 26 (stating that treatment for a joint
replacement costing at least $78,000, not including the surgeon’s fee, was denied by an
insurance company because it was related to a pre-existing condition).
76
Memorandum from the Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. on Documenting
Med. Necessity for Major Joint Replacement (Hip and Knee) (Sept. 17, 2012), available
at https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/
MLNMattersArticles/Downloads/SE1236.pdf (“CMS recognizes that joint replacement
surgery is reserved for patients whose symptoms have not responded to other
treatments. To avoid denial of claims for major joint replacement surgery [hip and
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individual electing to undergo an LEJR despite the contrary opinion
of his or her insurance company may have the discretionary income
to pay for at least part of the procedure out of pocket. A patient in
this position may choose from two options.
The first option is to remain in the U.S. and receive treatment
domestically. But this route is practically infeasible. The cost of a
TKR in the United States is approximately $25,398.77 The cost of a
total hip replacement (“THR”) is approximately $26,489.78 Given
the tremendous cost of care, is it unlikely that domestic treatment
without insurance will be a viable solution.79
The second option is to go overseas, where the same treatment
could cost thousands of dollars less.80 In a 2013 report, the
International Federation of Health Plans estimated that the cost of
THR is $8,010 in Spain, amounting to a savings of approximately
70%.81 The realistic option for individuals receiving medically
unnecessary care is to go overseas, which adversely contributes to
the total patient volume.
While eventually medically necessary care is subject to the same
sort of supporting rationale as medically necessary care, it does not
command the same level of exigency. Its priority of care is
somewhat less than medically necessary care, although higher than
that of cosmetic care.82 Regardless of priority and the associated
ethical dilemmas, eventually medically necessary care may still be
obtained as medically necessary care depending on time. If care is
eventually medically necessary, the analysis should parallel
medically necessary care: there should be no categorical bar on care
knee], the medical records should contain enough detailed information to support the
determination that major joint replacement surgery was reasonable and necessary for
the patient.”).
77
INT’L FED’N OF HEALTH PLANS, 2013 COMPARATIVE PRICE REPORT: VARIATION IN
MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL PRICES BY COUNTRY (2013). No significant change in price for
TKR was found between the 2012 report and the 2013 report. Id.
78
Id. at 21 (reporting that the price of a THR went down significantly from $40,364
in 2012 to $26,489 in 2013, over a 40% reduction in price). The cause of this decline
and whether it has any effect on the future of medical tourism is unknown.
79
See Williams, supra note 7, at 614 (stating that most individuals seeking medical
tourism solutions are “lower-middle class”).
80
See INT’L FED’N OF HEALTH PLANS, supra note 77.
81
Id.
82
See S. R. Mousavi, The Ethics of Aesthetic Surgery, J. CUTANEOUS & AESTHETIC
SURGERY 38–40 (2010), available at http://www.ncbi. nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC2890136/ (suggesting that cosmetic surgery is valuated differently based on why
it is being undertaken and stating that “[Ma]ny people” experience “real pain,
discomfort, social handicap and suffering” due to aesthetic appearance, but others
undergo cosmetic surgery for a “non-existent or minimal cosmetic ‘defect.’”).
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deemed eventually medically necessary.
This Note treats “eventually medically necessary care” as
equivalent to “medically necessary care” for the purposes of
discussion. Due to the lack of empirical evidence on the effect of
medical tourism, there is no clear rationale for separating the two.83
As patient volume grows and the U.S. health care system contends
with the possibility of volume shock, eventually medically necessary
care may be triaged, reduced, or even eliminated based on its
comparative exigency as compared to medically necessary care. But
it is premature to make that determination now.
B. Restricting Access to Purely Unnecessary Care
In contrast to “medically necessary” and “eventually medically
necessary care,” an argument can be made for restricting access to
purely medically unnecessary care regardless of the patient’s insured
status.84 The guiding principle behind this argument is that medical
tourism should be used as a release valve. Wherever possible,
medical tourism should not be used to supplant domestic health
services. Under this principle there are two rationales for curbing
medical tourism for purely medically unnecessary care.
The first justification is utilitarian. Unlike medically necessary
care, which is arguably essential to save, prolong, or improve quality
of life, purely medically unnecessary care (or cosmetic care) is
principally focused on enhancing appearance and improving
aesthetics.85 In that respect, purely medically unnecessary care is
subject more heavily to the law of diminishing returns.86 Whereas
a sick person may benefit greatly in overall health from receiving
83
See Cortez, supra note 6, at 70 (stating that current estimates of the frequency of
medical tourism are unreliable). See also Nathan Cortez, Embracing the New Geography
of Health Care: A Novel Way to Cover Those Left Out of Health Reform, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev.
859, 877–78 (2011) (citing industry studies varying wildly in their estimates of the
total number medical tourist patients, from five thousand to six million, and noting
that despite the variation in estimates, “most indicators point toward an unprecedented
migration of U.S. patients”).
84
See, e.g., Liza Khan, Note, Transgender Health at the Crossroads: Legal Norms,
Insurance Markets, and the Threat of Healthcare Reform, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS
375, 390–91 (citing James P. Jacobson, To Pay or Not To Pay, That is the Question:
Coverage Disputes Between Health Plans and Members, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 445,
448–49 (2007) (discussing exclusions for cosmetic and experimental treatments)).
85
Christine Nardi, Note, When Health Insurers Deny Coverage for Breast
Reconstructive Surgery: Gender Meets Disability, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 777, 783 n.34 (1997)
(“Cosmetic surgery is defined as a procedure ‘performed to reshape normal structures
of the body in order to improve the patient’s appearance and self-esteem.’”) (citations
omitted).
86
See Cohen, supra note 13, at 18–21.
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medical treatment, even if that treatment is abroad, a healthy person
seeking cosmetic surgery may not benefit to the same degree. In
other words, the total utility of a procedure undertaken for pure
cosmetic reasons is markedly less than a procedure undertaken for
a medically necessary purpose.
Previous literature reveals a correlation between the number of
medical tourism facilities specializing in a certain procedure and the
external demand of that procedure.87 Although it is true that this
relationship is not causative, it is possible that an increase in
medical tourism for a certain procedure is loosely related to the
number of medical tourism destinations that provide that
procedure. Assuming this assertion is true, increased demand for
cosmetic surgery encourages the development of cosmetic surgery
centers.88 By the same token, increased demand for TKRs may
promote the development of orthopedic surgery centers.89 In this
example, utility is maximized by establishing an orthopedic surgery
center rather than a cosmetic surgery center because it allows
indigenous people to avail themselves of a treatment solution that
would be more likely to increase overall utility.90
The second justification is normative. One goal of this Note is
to examine a way to use medical tourism to increase access to
medically necessary care. Allowing medical tourism for cosmetic
surgery would do nothing to further this goal. For example, assume
that there is a universal threshold for sufficient access to medically
necessary procedures, i.e., the threshold for receiving “sufficient
access” is equivalent across countries. Arguably, an individual
accessing medical tourism services for cosmetic purposes has
already met and exceeded the level of sufficient access to medically
necessary care.91 On the other hand, the vast majority of poor
87

Cohen, supra note 13, at 18–19.
Laura Hopkins et al., Medical Tourism Today: What Is the State of Existing
Knowledge, 31 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 189, 194 (2010).
89
Id. at 193 (suggesting that the commercial investment in medical tourism is
likely what is causing the largest effect on tiered health care access); see also Cohen,
supra note 13, at 9–10 (stating that the attractive option of providing cosmetic surgery
to U.S. patients may attract destination physicians away from providing care to the
indigenous poor). Cf. Rupa Chanda, Trade in Health Services, 80 BULL. OF THE WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 158, 160 (2002) (stating that investment from corporate medical tourist
facilities would most likely be diverted towards funding more “high-level technology”
medical tourist ventures and not towards the public health sector).
90
This assumes that the treatment will be available. But whether the price point
will be feasible is largely a function of whether public and private services are linked.
See, e.g., Chanda, supra note 89, at 162.
91
Cf. Pasquale, supra note 25, at 305 (implying that cosmetic surgery might in fact
88
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patients in destination countries do not have sufficient access to
medically necessary care.92 Further, there has been no evidence that
investing in medical tourism in general does anything to promote
access to care by poorer indigenous individuals.93 In fact, as
suggested above, foreign investment in medical tourism facilities
with specialties like cosmetic care may further reduce access of
indigenous persons to medically necessary care.94 In this case,
allowing medical tourism for cosmetic care should be questioned
because it does nothing to raise an indigenous population’s
threshold to sufficient access of medically necessary care.
If we assume that there is a threshold for health care access, it
is likely that an individual seeking cosmetic treatment has already
met that threshold for access to medically necessary care. On the
other hand, a poor destination patient likely has not met that
threshold for access. If we are to focus on raising the threshold of
access, it seems to be a greater investment of resources to raise the
access levels of individuals who are below the threshold of access
rather than those who are at or have exceeded this threshold. In
be a diamond good: a good “valued not necessarily for [its] intrinsic beauty or worth
but for [its] ability to show off one’s wealth”) (citing Richard Dusansky, Comment,
Diamonds Are a Government’s Best Friend: Burden-Free Taxes on Goods Valued for Their
Values, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1285, 1285 (1989) (discussing the economics of taxation on
“diamond goods”)).
92
China and India are representative of the medical tourism industry and the
availability of health care access to indigenous populations. See Alsharif et al., supra
note 12, at 319 (studying the effect of medical tourism on India, China, Jordan and the
United Arab Emirates); see also IMS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH CARE INFORMATICS,
UNDERSTANDING HEALTH CARE ACCESS IN INDIA 24, 33–36 (2013) (stating that expensive
private health care facilities significantly reduce overall access and affordability of
health care in India); “Ticking Time Bombs”: China’s Health Care System Faces Issues of
Access, Quality and Cost, WHARTON SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, http://knowledge.
wharton.upenn.edu/article/ticking-time-bombs-chinas-health-care-system-faces-issues
-of-access-quality-and-cost/ (last visited June 20, 2015) (giving an anecdotal account
of health care access issues in China); Juan Pablo Gutiérrez et al., Effective Access to
Health Care in Mexico, 14 BMC HEALTH SERV. RES. 1, 8 (2014) (suggesting with 95%
confidence that only 51.51% of Mexican citizens have access to effective health care).
93
This trickle-down effect assumes that general investment in medical tourism will
benefit the entire destination country and not only the destination facility. But this is
unsubstantiated. In fact, there seems to be evidence to the contrary—that trickle-down
economics is not effective in increasing medical tourism access to poorer individuals.
See Debora Lipson, quoted in ABC Radio National Background Briefing on Medical
Tourism, Feb. 20, 2005, at http://www.abc.net.au/cgi-bin/common/printfriendly.pl?
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/bbing/stories/s1308505.htm (“It’s just not the case
that [profits from medical tourism] are tapped and redirected to health services for the
poor, it just does not happen.”); see also STIGLITZ, supra note 33, at 23, 273 (stating that
trickle-down economics has been repeatedly shown to be ineffective).
94
Hopkins et al., supra note 88, at 194; see also supra text accompanying notes 87–
89.
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sum, the use of medical tourism to address medically necessary and
eventually medically necessary health conditions should not be
discouraged.
In brief summary, there are two different groups of persons
seeking overseas care: (1) individuals who are uninsured or
underinsured; and (2) the insurance incentivized. In addition, each
group can be further separated into three sub-groups based on the
type of care they are seeking. However based on the analysis above,
it would be ethically difficult to refuse lifesaving treatment for
uninsured or underinsured individuals.95 In contrast, it is justifiable
to remove cosmetic or purely medically unnecessary operations
insofar as they: (1) do not markedly increase the volume of patients
traveling abroad for medical tourism; and (2) because medically
unnecessary care tends to raise utilitarian and normative issues.96
We are left then with the question of how regulation can apply to
limit volume shock from insurance incentivized individuals seeking
medically necessary or eventually medically necessary care. Given
this landscape, how can a regulatory environment be constructed to
allow the growth of medical tourism, while simultaneously limiting
damage to the global health care framework?
III. DESIGNING A REGULATORY SYSTEM IN THE FACE OF VOLUME SHOCK
Currently, because the detrimental impact of medical tourism
to destination countries is unclear, there is no reason to categorically
eliminate access to medical tourism services. 97 Medical tourism
services can serve as a relief valve for priced out customers where
domestic health care markets have failed.98 However, this Note,
along with previous literature, recognizes that medical tourism is
also accompanied by numerous dangers.99 Rampant medical
tourism may lead to widespread failures of the global health care
framework.100
95
See discussion supra Part II. Florida v. United States, 648 F.3d 1235, 1358 (11th
Cir. 2011) (citing EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd) (“[N]early all hospitals are required
by law to provide emergency services to anyone, regardless of ability to pay.”).
96
See discussion supra Part II.
97
See generally, Chen & Flood, supra note 32, at 287 n.14 (“[T]here appears to be
consensus among academics that current understanding about medical tourism and its
effects on LMICs [low- and middle-income countries] largely derives from ‘theory,
assumption or conjecture.’”).
98
See supra note 36–40.
99
See Browne et al., supra note 26, at 325–46 (discussing dangers stemming from
the lack of regulations in medical tourism overseas).
100
See discussion supra Part II.
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One solution to this threat is to create a regulatory mechanism
that does not eradicate the practice of medical tourism, but instead
actively minimizes the risk of volume shock by adjusting outbound
patient volume. This part will describe a two stage regulatory system
that attempts to accomplish this goal. This solution will be applied
to the two categories of medical tourism beneficiaries enumerated
above: (1) uninsured and underinsured patients and (2) patients
being incentivized by insurance programs.101
The first stage is intended as an immediate patch: a temporary
solution that may become permanent if no further intervention is
necessary. The second stage is intended to address the long-term
problem and consists of more invasive regulatory procedures. The
mechanics of the second stage of the regulatory scheme are not
constructed in this Note. Rather, various control mechanisms are
suggested and the reader is invited to consider the contours of a
more comprehensive regulatory solution.
A. The Context of Medical Tourism Regulation
In the first stage, the United States should adopt a selfinterested philosophy by passively or prospectively applying
regulation while not discouraging the use of medical tourism. As
suggested above, the market has already embraced medical tourism
as a release valve for the ever-increasing cost of health care.102 In
fact, the utility of medical tourism, especially in its lower costs,
arguably cannot be disregarded due to increasing reliance on foreign
care.103 Recognizing these substantial cost savings, the next obvious
step is to encourage the use of medical tourism as a solution to the
problem of cost in health care; however, this is precisely what health
policymakers should avoid. Due to volume shock and the various
externalities generated by significant reliance on foreign medical
frameworks, medical tourism is not a solution.104 Allowing insurance

101
See discussion supra Part II (discussing categorization of medical tourism
beneficiaries based on insurance and treatment sought).
102
See discussion supra Part II, especially notes 36–39. Much existing literature has
documented the expansion of the medical tourism market, suggesting that consumers
have embraced medical tourism as a viable alternative to receiving domestic treatment.
See, e.g., Thomas McLean, The Global Market for Health Care: Economics and Regulation,
26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 591, 596 (2008) (“Until this current crisis in health insurance
affordability is resolved, it is likely to drive the expansion of the medical tourism
market.”) (footnote omitted) .
103
See, e.g., Cohen supra note 53, at 1525 (stating that a ban on medical tourism for
uninsured Americans would prevent access to nonemergency health care).
104
Cohen supra note 53, at 1526.
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companies to treat medical tourism as anything more than a
temporary fix or alternative to care will create a tremendous flood
of outward bound patients. The regulation this Note proposes seeks
to limit volume shock by giving patients the option to choose
between foreign and domestic care.
Currently, the main factor delaying volume shock is the federal
government’s reluctance to allow foreign health providers to
administer federal health programs. Federal health programs
prohibit approximately 41.1 million Medicare beneficiaries from
receiving health care outside the United States.105 The elderly people
who receive Medicare benefits require a higher level of medical
attention.106 It follows that, as the population ages, this would
create a huge demand for cheaply priced medical care.107 However,
because the federal government prohibits medical tourism as a
treatment option under Medicare, the total outbound patient
volume in foreign health systems remains insulated from this
potential flood of patients.108 This same line of reasoning can be
applied to Medicaid beneficiaries—approximately 48.6 million
105
CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE ENROLLMENT FOR AGED BENEFICIARIES:
AS OF JULY 1, 2012 (2012), available at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Dataand-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/MedicareEnrpts/Downloads/12Aged.pdf
(stating that the total number of Medicare beneficiaries is 41,116,359). But see, HENRY
J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., TOTAL NUMBER OF MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (2012), available at
http://kff.org/medicare/state-indicator/total-medicare-beneficiaries/ (stating that the
total number of Medicare beneficiaries in 2012 was 48,711,844). Statistics from U.S.
territories have been removed to offer a better comparison with data generated by CMS.
106
BARRY FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 534 (2013)
(“The population of the United States is steadily aging, and older people, particularly
those over 80, require a great deal of health care.”). But see Joseph White, (How) is
Aging a Health Policy Problem?, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 47, 48 (2004)
(“[P]olicymakers and citizens need not worry about the implications of aging for
medical costs. Aging of the population has some effect on health costs, but a much
smaller effect than those factors that are both more susceptible to manipulation and
pose less difficult ethical dilemmas.”).
107
See Mark S. Kopson, Medical Tourism: Implications for Providers and Plans, 3 J.
HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 147, 163–64 (2010) (describing Medicare beneficiaries as
“members of the fastest growing portion of the U.S. population”); see also FURROW ET
AL., supra note 106, at 534. While both Furrow et al. and White, talk about the effect
of aging vis-à-vis cost, it is important to see that cost is not necessarily entirely
coincidental with demand. The fact that services cost more, or less, than “our
perception” is not related to the overall demand for services. See White, supra note 106,
at 49.
108
42 C.F.R. § 411.9(a) (2015) states the basic rule that “Medicare does not pay for
services furnished outside the United States.” Subsection 1 then defines “United
States” as “the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
Guam, American Samoa, The Northern Mariana Islands, and for purposes of services
rendered on board ship, the territorial waters adjoining the land areas of the United
States.”
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persons.109
Federal health programs provide at least two self-regulatory
checks on medical tourism. First, as discussed above, federal health
programs literally prevent volume shock.110 Millions of persons
receiving federal health benefits are incentivized not to receive care
overseas because federal health programs simply do not pay for it.111
Second, so long as federal health programs do not adopt
medical tourism, its application in insurance plans will be stunted.
A government sanction promoting the use of medical tourism as a
solution to rising health costs would likely end the current model
of medical tourism as a relief valve. Government sanction of such
plans would bring medical tourism provisions out of experimental
status and accelerate the industry towards unsustainability.112 The
sheer volume of patients under the Medicare/Medicaid umbrella
illustrates the significant role that federal health programs have in
controlling the potential outbound patient flood. An uncontrolled
increase in the volume of medical tourism services would cause
serious problems for the health framework that exists today.
Therefore, while the United States should recognize the positive cost
effect of medical tourism, official sanction to promote its use should
be discouraged. Consequently, insurance companies will question
the feasibility of adopting medical tourism in force in the absence
of government sanction, further stemming patient volume from the
incentivized insured.

109
KAISER HEALTH NEWS, CENSUS BUREAU: AMERICANS ON MEDICAID STEADY AS POVERTY
RISES (2011), available at http://khn.org/morning-breakout/census-data-on-healthcoverage/.
110
See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
111
Whether federal health programs provide adequate incentive for patients to
remain in the domestic health network is a matter that is open for interpretation.
112
See, e.g., Adam Teicholz & Glenn Cohen, Some Insurance Companies Ask Their
Customers to Cross the Border for Care: Is the Practice Going to Spread?, NEW REPUBLIC (July
7, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118546/some-insurance-companiesask-customers-cross-border-care (suggesting that the practice of offering cross-border
care is a relatively new phenomenon); Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism
Reduce Health Care Costs?: Hearing before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 18
(2006) (statement of Arnold Milstein, M.D.); Cortez, supra note 14, at 121 (“Several
U.S. employers and insurers are beginning to experiment with cross-border health
insurance coverage . . . . Yet, this momentum has stalled in at least one instance.”)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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B. Making the Case for De Minimis Regulation
In order to limit volume, the United States should not take
action that sanctions or appears to sanction private medical tourism.
However, that is not to say that Congress must remain idle. Rather,
a federal statute or regulation can be implemented to control the
supply of patients while still refraining from a medical tourism
endorsement. That is to say, policy makers should create barriers
that prevent insurance companies from allowing U.S. patients to
contribute, unchecked, to the overall volume of medical tourism
patients.
This can be accomplished via federal regulation analogous to
that adopted by the Texas legislature prohibiting insurers from
providing medical tourism as the only available treatment option.113
Recall Texas Insurance Code § 1216.004, which states that no
insurance provider may “require[] an enrollee to travel to a foreign
country to receive a particular health care service.”114 Under Texas
law, while an insurance company may include a provision allowing
treatment to be provided overseas, a domestic alternative must be
made available. Essentially, this gives insured patients the option
to choose whether they will receive care domestically or abroad,
ensuring that a foreign service does not supplant a domestic one.115
An analogous federal regulation might read as follows: “No state
shall allow to be purchased or sold any health benefits plan that
requires a beneficiary to travel to a foreign country to receive a
particular health or medical procedure provided under that plan.”
The rationale behind this implementation is threefold.
First, regulation that requires insurers to offer alternatives to
foreign travel leaves the paradigm of medical tourism as a relief
valve in place.116 As described previously, the current paradigm is
not materially deficient.117 It allows private self-pay individuals to
travel overseas for medical care and, indeed, many Americans have

113

TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1216.004 (West 2009).
Id.
115
It must be noted here that the effect of this regulation is principally on insurance
incentivized patients. As discussed supra in Part II.A, it is unclear what effect, if any,
this regulation will have on uninsured or underinsured patients.
116
See also McLean, supra note 12, at 597 (calling medical tourism, “[a] new
paradigm for purchasing health care services”).
117
See supra Part III.A.
114
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come to rely on foreign health services.118 Further, so long as
insurers offer both foreign and domestic options to their patients,
insurance incentivized individuals may take advantage of lower
overseas rates.
Second, patient beliefs about medical tourism may self-regulate
and operate to limit overall patient volume abroad without
additional regulatory measures. As a cautionary aside, this possible
self-regulation applies only to the incentivized insured and does not
apply to uninsured or underinsured patients.119 For the uninsured
or underinsured, the problem of price appears to be a non-issue.120
Even if care is available both domestically and internationally, if
those individuals cannot afford health insurance—or if they can
afford the insurance, but the procedure is denied because it not
medically necessary—they will receive the care overseas anyway, if
at all.121 Insurance incentivized patient self-regulation may occur as
a combination of two related components: (a) moral hazard, and
(b) apprehension about overseas care.
In this context, moral hazard describes the tendency of
individuals to overconsume health care precisely because they are
insured.122 Since their inception, managed care organizations have
taken steps to reduce moral hazard, which increases the burden on
the health delivery system. Existing medical tourism plans have
taken similar steps to decrease the possibility of moral hazard. For
example, insurers in California offering cross-border plans use low
premium, high deductible plans to “minimize moral hazard.”123
Lower premiums “encourage patients to travel abroad in the first
instance” while high deductibles “could discourage moral
118
See supra note 82, at 286 (“The number of patients travelling from the developed
world to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) for treatments has ballooned in
recent years, primarily driven by difficulties with accessing affordable care at home.”).
119
As discussed supra in Part II.A, because underinsured and uninsured individuals:
(a) may heavily rely on medical tourism as their primary source of non-emergency care
and (b) are unaffected by insurance restrictions, self-regulation is unlikely to affect
these patients.
120
See Cohen, supra note 53, at 1480 (“The high cost of purchasing medical care
out of pocket is an obvious reason for uninsured Americans to consider medical
tourism, but it may play an important role for the underinsured as well.”).
121
After the passage of the ACA, there can be no denial of health treatment based
on a pre-existing condition. 45 C.F.R. § 147.108 (2015) (stating that “a health
insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage, may not
impose any preexisting condition exclusion”). Therefore, the single largest remaining
factor determining whether a health procedure is covered involves a usage
determination.
122
Cortez, supra note 14, at 101.
123
Id.
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hazard.”124 However, this Note argues the opposite: that moral
hazard, especially when coupled with pre-existing apprehension
about overseas care, can limit travel for medical care. Most insurance
companies do not offer cross-border coverage and, therefore, most
insurance incentivized patients are left to their own devices.125
When given the choice, individuals who have already paid
premiums to receive care may be financially inclined to undergo
treatment domestically. This is the precise definition of moral
hazard. 126
Additionally, factors other than price play a noteworthy role in
influencing where patients receive care.127 Presumably, individuals
remain apprehensive or uncomfortable with receiving care
overseas.128 Whether this concern arises from the fear of substandard quality of care or other concerns such as cultural, social, or
linguistic barriers, it is clear that medical tourism remains (at this
time) niche in part due to patient uncertainty.129 When this issue is
considered in conjunction with the effect of moral hazard, it appears
that insurance incentivized patients may, in fact, be self-regulating.
It should be noted that self-regulation is only feasible in a band
of values centered on an overseas care price point. Patients may
favor a domestic health provider over a foreign health provider even
if the comparative cost is higher, but only to a point. The extent of
that tolerance is unclear.130
The third rationale for the proposed regulation is that medical
tourism exposes the U.S. health care market to competitively lower
prices overseas.131 For example, in 2008, Hannaford Brothers, a
grocery chain, offered its employees the option of traveling to
124
Cortez, supra note 14, at 102. Professor Cortez writes that these schemes are to
be met with some skepticism, stating that “[i]t is not clear whether we should be as
optimistic as the World Bank that traditional insurance tools can effectively mitigate . . .
moral hazard in overseas medical care, as these tools have arguably not worked well in
the United States.”
125
Most cross-border care is still experimental. See supra note 112.
126
See Cortez, supra note 14, at 101.
127
See Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce Health Care Costs:
Hearing before the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 19 (2006) (statement of Arnold
Milstein, M.D.).
128
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 53, at 1482 (suggesting that factors such as language,
ethnic origin, cuisine, and religion effect patient comfort).
129
But this discomfort is eroding. See, e.g., Powers supra note 6, at 79 (stating that
the number of medical tourists visiting India alone tripled between 2002 and 2005).
130
The flexibility of individuals and willingness to pay around a certain medical
tourist price point has not been discussed in previous literature and is an excellent topic
for future research on the subject.
131
See Williams, supra note 7, at 625.
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Singapore for surgery, where the insurance company would cover
the bill.132 Although no employees availed themselves of the
service, Hannaford Brothers was contacted by a U.S. insurer
“offering to provide . . . [Hannaford’s] employees with comparably
priced operations in the U.S.”133 Additionally, a West Virginia bill
proposed in 2006 gave state employees treatment options overseas
at JCI-accredited hospitals.134 The bill proposed that employees
availing themselves of the care would receive reimbursement for
sick leave and a 20% rebate of the cost savings by the State.135 The
legislators intended the bill to “save the state money . . . and
encourage more competition between West Virginia medical
facilities.”136
In conclusion, regulations that give patients the option to
receive care overseas but do not limit patients to that option or
demand that it be exercised may be the most effective and least
invasive regulations available. Such regulations benefit from their
relative simplicity, ease of implementation, and—other than
possible right-to-travel issues—lack of material effect on
experimentation into providing cross-border care solutions.137
Further, self-regulation, preservation of medical tourism for at-risk
populations who rely on the service, and the possibility of increased
competition for domestic health providers all act to make this
regulation extremely attractive.

132
Bruce Einhorn, Hannaford’s Medical-Tourism Experiment, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS
(Nov. 9, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2008-11-09/hannafordsmedical-tourism-experimentbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financialadvice.
133
Id.
134
See also Williams, supra note 7, at 655–56.
135
Kris Wise, Bill Would Cover Surgeries Outside U.S., CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Feb.
3, 2006, at 7A.
136
Id.
137
Implementation of this type of regulation would be simple because it only
affects providers who offer cross-border options. Additionally, the regulation only
requires the review of managed care contracts—something that both state and federal
insurance regulating bodies already do. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 438.6 (2015) (stating that
for federal medical assistance programs, “[t]he CMS Regional Office must review and
approve all [managed care contracts]”); Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the
United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 626 (1999) (stating that in all places where
federal regulation is absent, states are free to impose their own regulations, particularly
with regard to insurance).
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C. Broad Brushstrokes and the Future of Medical Tourism
Regulation
This Note promotes a two-stage regulation mechanism. The
first stage involves regulation that gives consumers a choice between
domestic or foreign care.138 This sort of passive de minimis
regulation is simple to administer and can be quickly implemented.
In contrast, the second stage of regulation is more extensive and
complex and, because it is active, it should only come into effect as
a result of some triggering condition. The triggering condition
attempts to determine the point at which health care services being
offered to medical tourists would otherwise become available to the
destination country’s poor. The reason for using this particular
condition, which ostensibly focuses more on the demand for health
services in the destination country rather than the state of the U.S.
health care economy, is twofold.
First, medical tourism facilities currently have no proven
negative effect on destination countries.139 Although their positive
effect is also questionable at this point, the only definitive
conclusion is that medical tourism facilities have an unknown effect
on destination countries.140 This is because medical tourism
facilities cater to a price point and to a service that indigenous
patients cannot afford.141 Although current theorists fear a twotiered health delivery system will be established in destination
countries, it is unlikely that such a division exists at this time.142 It
is even possible that a system promoting this type of stratification
will never exist. The phenomenon of medical tourism may fade into
irrelevance as the U.S. health economy undergoes major overhauls
following the implementation of the ACA.143
Alternatively,
138

See discussion supra Part III.B, especially notes 113–15.
See supra note 83.
140
Id. at 877–78.
141
See Cohen, supra note 14, at 9 (stating that many indigenous patients are
unlikely to be able to afford boutique treatments provided to medical tourists anyway).
142
Churnrurtai Kanchanachitra, et al., Medical Tourism in Southeast Asia:
Opportunites and Challenges, in RISKS AND CHALLENGES IN MEDICAL TOURISM:
UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL MARKET FOR HEALTH SERVICES 56, 76–79 (Jill R. Hodges,
Leigh Turner & Ann Marie Kimball, eds., 2012).
143
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT—CBO’S FEBRUARY 2014 BASELINE (2014), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43900-2014-02-ACAtables.pdf (suggesting that the
ACA will reduce the total number of uninsured by approximately 25 million). See also
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2613 (2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
18091(2)(C) and (1) (2006 ed., Supp. IV)) (stating that the central aim of the ACA is
to reduce the total number of uninsured Americans).
139
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continued economic development in destination countries may
create robust health systems to adequately cater to indigenous
populations and medical tourists.144
At this point, it is difficult to suggest that medical tourism
creates a two-tiered system of health delivery since poor individuals
would be unable to access health care regardless of the existence of
medical tourism facilities.145 For example, it is currently unlikely
that medical tourism by U.S. patients in New Delhi would diminish
access to those services utilized by poor Indian patients.146
Therefore, the triggering condition of prospective regulation
correctly focuses on the moment when health tourism actually
begins to affect the viability of destination country health services.
Second, the Joint Commission International (“JCI”) is currently
collecting data that informs this triggering condition.147 As part of
its certification process, JCI collects information on patient clinical
records.148 The JCI standard states that a hospital must “initiate[]
and maintain[] a standardized clinical record for every patient
assessed or treated and determine[] the record’s content, format, and
location of entries.”149 Further, the “clinical record [must] contain[]
sufficient information to identify the patient . . . [and] to justify the
treatment.”150 Although the purpose of this Note is not to explain
the information collection methods of the JCI, it is possible that
information regarding hospital capacity, the nationality of treated
patients, and the type of treatment they are receiving is already
available through JCI records.151 Ideally, this data might be used to
extrapolate an estimate or basis for indigenous demand for health

144
See Kanchanachitra et al., supra note 142, at 76–79. (“[T]here are little definitive
data on the extent to which the benefits of medical tourism, which at least initially
accrue to private hospitals, eventually extend to the public sector.”). While tax
incentives and other government efforts to promote medical tourism theoretically
increase access of care to poorer patients, there is no consensus as to the actual effect.
Id. The matter remains a topic of fierce debate.
145
See Cohen, supra note 13, at 9 (“[M]edical tourism by American patients . . .
would not necessarily diminish access for poor Indian patients (which would remain
steady at virtually none).”).
146
There is some danger that medical tourism limits access to indigenous middleclass and wealthy persons. See Cohen, supra note 13, at 9–10.
147
See Williams, supra note 7, at 680.
148
JOINT COMM’N INT’L, JOINT COMMISSION INTERNATIONAL ACCREDITATION STANDARDS
FOR HOSPITALS 66 (5th ed., 2014), available at http://www.jointcommission
international.org/assets/3/7/Hospital-5E-Standards-Only-Mar2014.pdf.
149
Id.
150
Id. (emphasis added).
151
See Williams, supra note 7, at 640–42, 680.
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services.152 Thus, the information necessary to create an effective
regulatory triggering mechanism, and the regulatory system itself,
might be available now in the data JCI currently collects.153
The second stage regulatory mechanism operates under the
following assumptions. First, at the time of this writing, medical
tourism has been accepted as a relief valve for source health systems.
Insurers and patients have already reaped the benefits of medical
tourism and will be accustomed to its presence.154 Therefore,
complete removal of a medical tourism option is impracticable.
Second, medical tourism as the sole option for patients will have
been curbed or eliminated due to the effect of the stage one
regulation.155 This regulation would have hopefully allowed
domestic markets to reclaim some volume of patients requiring
eventually medically necessary services. Third, at the time phase two
regulation is necessary, something must be done to limit the growth
of medical tourism such that output bound patient volume remains
at a level that will not upset the balance of the global health care
framework. Two possible plans of action that adhere to the
constraints above may prevent unsustainable medical tourism
growth.
The first plan of action involves rationing medical tourism
services. Rationing is often seen as a “dirty word” in the health care
context.156 However, rationing recognizes that medical services are
limited by financial constraints.157 Rationing care, especially in the
private health insurance market, may be more tenable in the context
of medical tourism because doing so constitutes rationing a
supplemental health resource rather than a primary health resource.
While the actual machinery of rationing care is beyond the ambit of
this discussion, this Note envisions two types of rationing
paradigms: rationing based on medical procedure and rationing
based on volume. 158
152

For example, by looking at nationality of the patient and type of treatment
received.
153
There is an outstanding issue with privacy of patient data. However, this issue
is beyond the scope of this Note.
154
This is assuming that the phenomenon has room to expand, which evidence, at
least on an anecdotal level, seems to support. See Cortez, supra note 14, at 108.
155
See supra Part III.B.
156
Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/magazine/19healthcare-t.html (“In the current
U.S. debate over health care reform, rationing has become a ‘dirty word.’”).
157
Id.
158
For more information on various rationing paradigms, see Leslie P.
Scheunemann & Douglas B. White, The Ethics and Reality of Rationing in Medicine, 140

CHOU FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

MEDICAL TOURISM REGULATION

2/5/2016 9:01 PM

215

In the rationing based on medical procedure framework,
private insurers may allow a medical tourism option only for
medically necessary care. This method of rationing has already been
practiced to some extent in Europe. Currently, Medicare and
Medicaid already provide guidelines on what constitutes medically
necessary care.159 It would not be a substantial deviation to apply
those guidelines to rationing medical care. The current CMS
guidelines on medical necessity for orthopedic implants could be
used to determine eligibility for medical tourism to receive such an
implant.160 This sort of rationing does eliminate eventually
medically necessary care, but it is needed to prevent volume shock.
In the rationing based on volume framework, rationing
medical care would be centered on the number of people who are
permitted to obtain a certain procedure. While rationing based on
medical procedure is theoretically limitless, rationing based on
volume sets a numerical cap on the number of individuals who can
actually obtain certain treatment. Rationing based on volume is
especially controversial because it poses the same question that
medical tourism is intended to solve: how can individuals obtain
medically necessary care if they do not meet the quota?
Additionally, adopting rationing ex post—after medical tourism is
allowed to flourish—is atavistic. It amounts to a regression from
being able to offer certain medical services via exploitation of the
global health market to being unable to offer such services.
However, the complexity of this matter is beyond the scope of this
Note.
Both types of rationing involve difficult value based
determinations that must weigh cost versus quality of life. For
example, a decision to forgo a certain medical procedure due to its
low incident rate could doom patients with rare diseases when
rationing is based strictly on what type of medical procedures are
provided.161 Rationing based on volume presents an equally
CHEST J. 1625, 1626–27 (2011).
159
See HOUGLUM, supra note 66.
160
Id.
161
See Singer, supra note 156. The article describes Britain’s National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence’s (NICE) recommendation against the use of Pfizer’s
drug Sutent for patients with advanced kidney cancer. The cost for the drug exceeded
the £30,000 (or $49,000) cost of extending life for one year. Six months later, NICE
reversed its decision after Pfizer agreed to administer the first round of treatment free
for the National Health Service, making the treatment more cost effective. See Henry
Scowcroft, NICE Recommends Sutent (sunitinib) for Advanced Kidney Cancer, CANCER
RESEARCH
UK
(Feb.
4,
2009),
http://scienceblog.cancerresearchuk.
org/2009/02/04/nice-recommends-sutent-sunitinib-for-advanced-kidney-cancer/.
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uncomfortable situation where a lottery system is used to determine
priority.162 While these ethical questions remain unanswered, they
are important considerations in deciding what path the United
States should take if stage two regulation becomes necessary.
The second plan of action to prevent unsustainable medical
tourism growth should use rationing based on medical procedure.
In other words, private insurers may allow a medical tourism option
only for medically necessary care. As stated above, the usage of the
term medically necessary should continue to follow Medicare and
Medicaid guidelines. One implementation of this plan involves
imposing taxes on the use of medical tourism.163 Imposing a tax on
medical tourism must be done according to some sort of procedure
triage—operations that are medically necessary should incur the
least amount of tax, with eventually medically necessary procedures
taxed at a middle tier, and cosmetic care taxed most heavily.
Imposing different tax levels on specific types of medical tourism
will limit undesirable behavior while still allowing the procedures
to be undertaken where medically necessary.164
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no substitute for widespread national health care
reform. Medical tourism acts in a temporary capacity as a relief valve
for costly health care in the U.S.165 However, medical tourism is not
intended to be the panacea. Hopefully, by phasing in regulation,
medical tourism will be allowed to relieve financial pressure on
patients in the United States as long as it is possible. This has the
added benefit of exposing the American health care system to
foreign pressure to aid in overall cost reduction. Despite these
perceived benefits, all the proposed regulatory devices are
predicated on the need for more data. Principally, the key data
point missing for these regulations and their effective
implementation is information on the number of Americans who
162

See Scheunemann & White, supra note 158, at 1628.
For a more detailed discussion of how tax law may be used to influence medical
tourism, see I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and the
Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1513–16 (2010).
164
Cigarette taxes are a good example of using tax policy to regulate certain
undesirable behavior. For example, a Thai study performed in 2009 showed that
increasing taxes for cigarettes reduced smoking at least 48%. See Mondha
Kengganpanich, Lakkhana Termsirikulchai & Sarunya Benjakul, The Impact of Cigarette
Tax Increase on Smoking Behavior of Daily Smokers, 92 J. MED. ASSOC. THAI. S46, S48
(Supp. 7) (2009).
165
See supra notes 36–40.
163
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will travel abroad and for what treatment or procedure. Finally,
empirical data on the effect of medical tourism in destination
countries, including patient nationality and medical procedure,
would be invaluable in ensuring a better analysis of the global
landscape of medical tourism.
There are numerous uncertainties about medical tourism that
make it difficult to predict what its likely effects will be. It is possible
that these anticipated issues will never materialize. However, that
does not alleviate the need to err on the side of caution in order to
best prevent both domestic and international problems from
arising. At this point, the next step should be to implement a
regulatory scheme that allows de minimis control of patient volume
and the continuation of research regarding what an elaborate and
complete regulatory solution should aim to achieve.

